



Edwards Property Group

**Collins Street Bicycle Lanes and
Associated Infrastructure Post-
Installation Technical Review**

August 2026



CELEBRATING 18 YEARS
2008 - 2026

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1. Executive Summary

This independent post-installation review of the Collins Street bicycle lane trial has found that, approximately one year after opening, the project has not demonstrated the safety, cycling participation, traffic or environmental outcomes that were intended.

The most significant concern is road safety, particularly for cyclists and other vulnerable road users. While the overall reported crash rate on Collins Street is essentially unchanged from the longer-term pre-installation average, the type of crashes occurring has changed materially. In more than six years before installation there was only one recorded cyclist crash, which did not involve injury. In approximately the first year following installation there have been four cyclist crashes, including two injury crashes.

These outcomes are particularly concerning because they coincide with hazards created or exacerbated by the trial infrastructure. One cyclist injury crash involved a rider striking a concrete lane separator. The first recorded vehicle-door crash on the corridor has also occurred during the trial period, while parking-related crashes have increased despite there being less parking and less traffic on Collins Street.

An independent Post-Opening Road Safety Audit has separately identified significant deficiencies in the constructed design. These include an Extreme-rated bus turning conflict at Barrack Street, inadequate separation between parked vehicles and the bicycle lane, hazards associated with the concrete lane separators, conflicts at the in-line bus stop and new zebra crossing, and abrupt changes in traffic-lane alignment.

This raises a fundamental concern with the safety outcome of the project. Separated cycling infrastructure is intended to provide both actual and perceived protection for cyclists. Where that infrastructure is constructed within a constrained corridor and to compromised dimensions, however, it can create an appearance of safety without delivering the level of protection that users may reasonably expect. In that circumstance, the infrastructure risks providing cyclists with a false sense of security while introducing hazards that were not previously present.

The available evidence also does not demonstrate that cycling activity has increased as a result of the trial. Council's reported 15 per cent increase is based on a comparison between two individual months using an uncalibrated AI video-recognition counter. Testing undertaken for this review found that a comparable automatic counter substantially mis-counted cyclists and could not reliably be used to measure absolute cycling volumes.

The more direct evidence is provided by manual surveys undertaken before and after installation. Those surveys recorded lower cyclist volumes following installation across the corridor. After allowing for seasonal differences, the available data indicates cyclist volumes were approximately 17 to 37 per cent lower. The different survey periods mean that the precise magnitude of any change should be treated cautiously, but the evidence presently available does not support a conclusion that cycling has increased. Rather, the direct measurements point in the opposite direction.

Vehicle traffic on Collins Street has also fallen, but the evidence indicates that this traffic has largely redistributed onto the surrounding road network rather than disappeared through a shift to cycling. Traffic

through Collins Street fell by approximately 9 to 13 per cent, with the largest reductions occurring during peak periods. At the same time, traffic increased on surrounding routes including Barrack Street, Molle Street and Bathurst Street, with Bathurst Street alone carrying approximately 288 additional northbound vehicles per day.

The concentration of the Collins Street reductions in the morning and evening peaks is consistent with a loss of road capacity. The removal of dedicated turning lanes means turning vehicles now block through traffic at the signalised intersections, limiting the volume of traffic the corridor can carry during its busiest periods. The independent Road Safety Audit observed this congestion in operation.

The trial has therefore not demonstrated the anticipated shift from private vehicle travel to cycling. Collins Street is carrying fewer vehicles, but cyclist volumes have not increased to replace those trips. Instead, traffic has been displaced to other parts of the CBD road network, including routes that are already congested.

This also has consequences for the project's environmental objectives. Increased intersection delay, additional stopping and queuing, the operation of the in-line bus stop and the diversion of vehicles onto longer and already-congested alternative routes all increase inefficient stop-start vehicle operation. While a detailed emissions model has not been undertaken, the evidence indicates that the trial is unlikely to have reduced vehicle emissions and has more probably increased them across the surrounding network.

The review does not question the value of improving cycling infrastructure in Hobart. Well-designed cycling infrastructure can improve safety, encourage active transport and contribute to broader transport and environmental objectives. The issue is whether the particular design implemented in Collins Street is achieving those outcomes.

On the evidence available after approximately one year of operation, it is not. The project has not demonstrated an increase in cycling activity, has displaced vehicle traffic onto surrounding streets, has increased congestion and is unlikely to have reduced emissions. Most importantly, it has not delivered the expected road safety outcome for cyclists.

The purpose of a trial is to test a proposal against real-world evidence and respond where that evidence identifies problems. The emerging crash record, together with the findings of the independent Road Safety Audit and the geometric constraints of the installed design, provides a strong basis for intervention. The identified safety hazards should be addressed as a priority, irrespective of any longer-term decision about the future of the Collins Street trial.

2. Introduction

2.1 Background

Midson Traffic was engaged by Edwards Property Group to undertake an independent review of the constructed Collins Street bicycle lane project. This report presents the findings of that review, prepared approximately one year after the trial was opened.

In September 2024, Hobart City Council resolved to proceed with the Transforming Collins Street trial, comprising separated bicycle lanes, streetside dining areas and associated changes to the road environment between Molle Street and Murray Street. The trial was officially opened on 30 May 2025. Council committed to monitoring the trial at defined intervals and has published a series of monitoring reports, the most recent being its Twelve-Month Post-Installation report (July 2026).

Prior to implementation, Midson Traffic prepared an independent technical assessment of the proposed scheme (*Collins Street Bicycle Lanes Technical Assessment*, January 2025). That assessment identified a number of concerns regarding road safety, traffic operation, parking, network performance and the overall effectiveness of the proposed design.

The purpose of the present report is to assess, on the basis of the evidence now available, whether the constructed scheme has achieved its intended outcomes, and to compare the observed operational and safety performance against both the objectives of Council's project and the predictions of the original technical assessment.

2.2 Context

It is important to acknowledge at the outset that improving cycling infrastructure within urban areas can deliver significant benefits when appropriately planned and designed. Increased cycling participation has the potential to improve public health outcomes, reduce transport emissions, reduce reliance on private vehicles and contribute to a more vibrant and accessible city. The objectives of the Transforming Collins Street project are commendable, and the use of a trial to test infrastructure under real-world conditions is sound planning practice.

A trial is valuable precisely because it allows a design to be evaluated against observed evidence rather than assumptions, and modified where the evidence indicates this is warranted. The assessment that follows should be read in that context. The question is not whether cycling infrastructure is worthwhile in principle, but whether the particular design implemented in Collins Street is delivering the outcomes that were intended for it.

2.3 Scope and Review

This review is evidence-based and draws on the traffic, cyclist and crash data now available for the corridor, together with operational observations. It addresses:

- Traffic network performance, including changes in traffic volumes along Collins Street and on adjacent streets, and any redistribution of traffic arising from the reallocation of road space;
- Cyclist volumes, comparing pre-installation survey data with continuous post-installation monitoring, including daily and weekday patterns, peak demand, seasonal variation, and whether any change in usage is statistically meaningful;
- Road safety, including a comparison of pre- and post-implementation crash history, detailed assessment of crashes involving cyclists and pedestrians, and the identification of any emerging crash trends;
- Congestion and environmental performance, including intersection delay and the associated implications for vehicle emissions;
- Bus and heavy vehicle operation through the corridor and at the adjoining intersections; and
- The findings of an independent Road Safety Audit of the completed scheme.

The review has also had regard to Council's own monitoring reports, and considers the extent to which the conclusions drawn in those reports are supported by the underlying data.

2.4 Supporting Documentation

This report has been prepared with reference to the following principal documents:

- Collins Street Bicycle Lanes Technical Assessment, Midson Traffic, January 2025;
- Transforming Collins Street – Twelve-Month Post-Installation Monitoring Report, City of Hobart, July 2026;
- Collins Street, Hobart TAS – Bicycle Lane Trial, Post Opening Road Safety Audit, Trafficworks, August 2026;
- Building Tasmania crash data for Collins Street between Molle Street and Murray Street; and
- traffic and cyclist volume data for the corridor, including continuous post-installation cyclist counts and pre-installation directional surveys.

Where appropriate, recommendations are provided to improve the operation and safety of the corridor.

3. Scope and Data Sources

3.1 Study Area

This review considers Collins Street between Molle Street and Murray Street, being the extent of the trial installation. Collins Street is a local road under the management of the City of Hobart, generally aligned north-east to south-west, and operates as a two-lane, two-way road through the trial section. A 40 km/h speed limit applies, reduced to 30 km/h between Harrington Street and Murray Street.

The trial, opened on 30 May 2025, installed separated bicycle lanes in both directions through this section, together with streetside dining, a new zebra crossing near Victoria Street, an in-line bus stop, planter-box separation and associated works. The installation removed on-street car parking (with some loading bays retained) and removed dedicated turn lanes on the south-west approach of Murray Street, both approaches of Harrington Street, and the south-west approach of Barrack Street.

Where relevant to the redistribution of traffic, the review also has regard to conditions on adjacent streets, including Bathurst Street, Liverpool Street and Macquarie Street.

Figure 1 Study Area




Image Source: LIST Map, DNRE

3.2 Data Sources

The review is based on the following principal datasets.

Cyclist volumes — continuous post-installation counts. Continuous daily counts of northbound cyclists were obtained for the section of Collins Street between Victoria Street and Murray Street, covering the period 10 May 2025 to 2 July 2026. The counts were recorded by an automatic AI video-recognition counter and provide a daily total together with the peak hour count for each day. As set out in Section 2.3, calibration against a manual survey established that this system substantially under-detects cyclists. The continuous data is therefore used in this review for the assessment of trends — seasonal variation, weekday and weekend patterns, and change over the monitoring period — and not as a measure of absolute cyclist volumes.

Cyclist volumes — pre-installation survey. Directional cyclist counts were recorded in November 2024, prior to installation, at four locations along the corridor — Molle Street, Barrack Street, Harrington Street and Murray Street. The survey provides northbound and southbound counts by hour across a full seven-day week, and forms the pre-installation baseline for the assessment of cyclist volumes.

Cyclist volumes — post-installation calibration survey. A manual classified cyclist survey was undertaken on Thursday 23 July 2026 over a 12-hour period (7:00 am to 7:00 pm) at three locations along the corridor — between Molle Street and Barrack Street, between Barrack Street and Harrington Street, and between Harrington Street and Murray Street. The survey recorded northbound and southbound cyclists in 15-minute intervals. It serves two purposes: to calibrate the continuous AI counter against a manual count on the same day, location and direction; and to provide a directional, corridor-wide snapshot of post-installation cyclist activity that the single-direction, single-block continuous counter cannot.

Bus operations survey. A 12-hour manual survey of the in-line bus stop between Harrington Street and Murray Street was undertaken on the same day (23 July 2026), recording bus arrival and departure times (dwell time) and the northbound vehicle queue length associated with each bus movement. This informs the assessment of the in-line bus stop and its effect on general traffic.

Traffic volumes. Vehicle volume data for Collins Street and comparison counts on parallel streets were used to assess changes in through-traffic along the corridor and any redistribution of traffic to the surrounding network.

Crash data. Reported crash records were obtained from the Building Tasmania (formerly the Department of State Growth) crash database for Collins Street between Molle Street and Murray Street, spanning February 2019 to June 2026. The dataset includes crash date, severity, unit types involved, movement classification and location, enabling analysis of crash frequency, severity and type across the pre- and post-installation periods.

Intersection modelling. SIDRA modelling was undertaken using before-and-after traffic signal data to assess changes in intersection delay resulting from the trial, and to inform the assessment of vehicle emissions.

Independent Road Safety Audit. A Post-Opening Road Safety Audit of the completed scheme was undertaken by Trafficworks (August 2026), in accordance with the Austroads *Guide to Road Safety Part 6:*

Road Safety Audits (2022). The audit findings are referred to where they corroborate or inform the operational and safety assessment.

Council monitoring data. Council's Twelve-Month Post-Installation Monitoring Report (July 2026) and its associated quantitative data have been reviewed, and the conclusions drawn in that report are considered against the underlying evidence.

3.3 Limitations

This review is based on the data available at the time of preparation. Reported crash data is subject to the usual limitations of any crash database, including the potential for under-reporting, and the post-installation period represents a little over one year of operation. The number of crashes involved is small, which limits the statistical inferences that can be drawn from year-to-year change. These limitations are considered in the relevant sections, and the findings are expressed with appropriate regard to them. Consistent with the purpose of a trial, the review is concerned with whether the evidence available to date supports the outcomes intended for the scheme, rather than with establishing conclusions to a level of certainty that the trial period does not yet allow.

4. Cyclist Volumes

One of the stated objectives of the trial, and the first of Council's seven monitoring metrics, was to increase the number of bicycle and micromobility riders on Collins Street. Council's Twelve-Month Post-Installation report concludes that cycling has increased, citing a 15 per cent rise in the number of cyclists between April 2025 and April 2026. This section examines the available cyclist volume data and assesses whether that conclusion is supported.

4.1 Data Used and its Basis

Three sources of cyclist data are relevant:

- November 2024 pre-installation survey — a manual classified count of northbound and southbound cyclists, recorded by hour across a full seven-day week at four locations along the corridor (Molle, Barrack, Harrington and Murray Streets);
- Continuous AI counter — an automatic video-recognition system recording northbound cyclists only, in the single block between Victoria Street and Murray Street, from May 2025 onward; and
- 23 July 2026 survey — a manual classified count of northbound and southbound cyclists over a 12-hour period (7:00 am to 7:00 pm) at three locations along the corridor, undertaken to calibrate the continuous counter and to provide a directional, corridor-wide snapshot.

The basis on which each source can properly be used is important, and is addressed before the volume findings are presented.

4.2 Continuous Cyclist Volume Data Collection

A continuous automatic counter, using AI video recognition, has recorded northbound cyclists in the block between Victoria Street and Murray Street since May 2025. When checked against the manual survey undertaken on 23 July 2026 for the same location and direction, the counter was found to consistently and substantially under-count cyclists.

The continuous counter has therefore not been relied upon in this review as a measure of actual cyclist volumes. Because the under-count is systematic, however, the counter remains a useful indicator of relative patterns over time, and is used only for that purpose — to assess seasonal variation, the difference between weekdays and weekends, and the trend over the monitoring period.

4.3 Change in Cyclist Volumes Since Inception

Because the continuous counter and the November 2024 survey are not measured on a comparable basis, the change in cyclist volumes is assessed by comparing the two manual surveys directly — the November 2024 pre-installation survey and the 23 July 2026 post-installation survey. Both are 12-hour manual directional counts, and the comparison is drawn for the same day of the week (Thursday) at each location.

The two surveys were undertaken at slightly different points. The November 2024 survey recorded northbound and southbound through-movements at the intersections along the corridor (Molle, Barrack, Harrington and Murray Streets), while the July 2026 survey recorded cyclists within each block. For each block, the November 2024 count is taken from the intersection at the upstream end of the movement — that is, the southern intersection for northbound movements and the northern intersection for southbound movements — as this most directly represents cyclists entering that block. The November 2024 survey also extended to a fourth block north of Murray Street (Murray Street to Elizabeth Street); this section lies outside the scope of the present review and has been excluded.

4.3.1 The corridor as a cyclist route

The interpretation of the directional counts is assisted by an understanding of how the corridor functions for cyclists. Collins Street terminates at its southern end at the South Hobart Rivulet Track, a principal off-road cycling route. The dominant cycling movement along Collins Street is northbound — cyclists entering the corridor from the Rivulet Track at its southern end and travelling toward the city. Southbound movement has historically been the weaker, return direction, and cyclists returning from the city have other route choices closer to the CBD rather than the northern end of Collins Street. Collins Street north of Murray Street operates one-way northbound, such that before the trial there was limited opportunity for a southbound cyclist to enter the corridor at its northern end. This is reflected in the November 2024 data, in which southbound volumes taper from 199 at the southern (Molle Street) end to 28 at the northern (Murray Street) end.

4.3.2 Northbound Movements

Northbound is the primary cycling movement on the corridor, and it has fallen substantially at every location. The comparison is summarised in Table 1.

Table 1 Northbound Cyclist Volumes – Nov 2024 vs July 2026

Block	Nov 2024	Jul 2026	Change
Molle St – Barrack St	186	106	–43%
Barrack St – Harrington St	178	92	–48%
Harrington St – Murray St	192	91	–53%

Northbound cyclist volumes on the surveyed Thursday were between 43 and 53 per cent lower than the pre-installation survey, consistently across all three blocks.

4.3.3 Southbound Movements

Southbound volumes at the two interior locations, where the southbound path was available before the trial, have also fallen:

- Molle St – Barrack St: 121 (Nov 2024, at Barrack St) to 97 (Jul 2026), a reduction of approximately 20 per cent;
- Barrack St – Harrington St: 100 (Nov 2024, at Harrington St) to 47 (Jul 2026), a reduction of approximately 53 per cent.

The Harrington St – Murray St block is a distinct case. Southbound volume there rose, from 28 in November 2024 to 45 in July 2026. This is the only movement in the survey to increase. As noted above, Collins Street north of Murray Street is one-way northbound traffic flow, so prior to the trial a southbound cyclist had limited means of entering the corridor at that point, and southbound demand at Murray Street was correspondingly very low. The observed increase is consistent with cyclists now entering Collins Street at its northern end to use the new two-way separated infrastructure, rather than with an overall increase in cycling. It reflects a redistribution of existing cyclists onto the new facility at the one location where the previous network configuration had suppressed the movement, and should not be read as evidence of growth in cycling demand.

4.3.4 Overall Change and Seasonal Context

The two surveys were undertaken in different seasons — the pre-installation survey in November (late spring) and the post-installation survey in July (mid-winter). Cyclist volumes vary seasonally, with winter volumes sitting below spring volumes, so a portion of the measured reduction reflects this seasonal difference rather than a change attributable to the trial. It is therefore necessary to account for the seasonal effect before drawing a conclusion about the underlying change.

The continuous counter provides a means of estimating the seasonal difference. Although the counter does not reliably measure absolute cyclist volumes, it can be used to estimate the *relative* difference between two periods, because a systematic under-count affects both periods equally and cancels in the ratio. On this basis, mid-winter (July) weekday cycling activity on the corridor runs at approximately 79 per cent of the November level — that is, a July count would be expected to sit around a fifth below a November count for seasonal reasons alone.

Adjusting the July 2026 survey figures upward to a November-equivalent basis (by a factor of approximately 1.26) allows a like-season comparison with the November 2024 survey.

On this adjusted basis, two-way cyclist volumes remain substantially lower following installation, as summarised in Table 2.

Table 2 Two-Way Cyclist Volumes, Nov 2024 vs July 2026

Block	Nov 2024	Jul 2026	Raw Change	Seasonally adjusted change
Molle St – Barrack St	307	203	–34%	-17%
Barrack St – Harrington St	278	139	–50%	-37%
Harrington St – Murray St ¹	220	136	–38%	-22%

After adjustment for the seasonal difference, two-way cyclist volumes are estimated to have fallen by approximately 17 to 37 per cent across the corridor. The seasonal difference between the two surveys therefore accounts for part, but by no means all, of the measured reduction: a substantial decline remains once season is taken into account. This is a conservative treatment, in that it adopts the full seasonal adjustment indicated by the counter; the reduction attributable to the trial would not be expected to be smaller than this range, and a direct like-season re-count would be required to measure it precisely.

4.4 Trends Over the Monitoring Period

While the continuous counter cannot establish absolute volumes, its record over the period May 2025 to June 2026 is informative as to how cycling activity has moved over time. Three patterns are evident, each of which is expressed here as a relative (index) observation rather than an absolute count.

Seasonal variation. The counter shows a clear and consistent seasonal cycle, with a winter trough between June and October and a spring–summer peak between February and April. This is the expected pattern for a commuter cycling route in Hobart and confirms that season is a material factor in any point-in-time comparison.

Weekday and weekend patterns. Cycling activity on the corridor is strongly weekday-oriented, with weekday activity running at roughly two and a half times weekend levels. The busiest days are mid-week. This is characteristic of commuter cycling rather than recreational use.

Trend within the monitoring period. After the initial start-up month is set aside, the counter shows no sustained upward or downward trend over the monitoring period once the seasonal cycle is accounted for. Activity oscillates seasonally around a stable level. On the evidence of the continuous record, cycling on the corridor has neither recovered toward its pre-installation level nor continued to decline following the initial reduction; it has settled at a lower level and remained there. The reduction identified in Section 4.3 is therefore best characterised as a sustained step change associated with the installation, rather than a continuing decline.

4.5 Assessment of Council's Cycling Volume Conclusion

Council's report concludes that cycling has increased, on the basis of a 15 per cent rise in the number of cyclists recorded by its VivaCity device at the Collins Street/ Harrington Street intersection between April 2025 and April 2026. Two matters bear on the reliability of this conclusion.

First, the comparison is drawn between April 2025 and April 2026. April 2025 preceded the opening of the trial on 30 May 2025 and was described by Council as the last month of "pure" pre-trial data. However, May 2025 was also a pre-installation month, and the choice of April as the baseline is not explained beyond this. A single month compared against a single month, twelve months apart, is sensitive to weather, to the particular days that fell within each month, and to any localised factors affecting either period. It is a narrow basis for a headline conclusion, and no assessment of statistical significance is provided.

Second, and more fundamentally, Council's figure is derived from an AI video-recognition counter of the same general type as the continuous counter examined in this review. Our own experience of such a counter on this corridor is that it did not reliably measure actual cyclist volumes; when checked against a manual survey, it was found to under-count. That direct experience gives reason to doubt any conclusion that relies on an uncalibrated AI counter to measure cycling activity, including Council's. Council's device has not been independently calibrated, and it is notable that, for the reported 15 per cent increase to reflect a genuine change, the device would need to have counted reliably or to have over-counted in the later period — the opposite of the under-counting we observed. Whichever the case, the reliability of the underlying measurement has not been demonstrated. A year-on-year change of the order of 15 per cent, derived from an uncalibrated automatic counter and based on a single month in each of the two years, cannot be distinguished from variation in the performance of the counter itself — for example, as a result of changes in lighting, weather, vegetation or software between the two periods — and does not provide a sound basis for concluding that cycling has increased.

This concern is reinforced by Council's own report. In a footnote to its cyclist-count data, Council acknowledges a discrepancy between the numbers recorded by its manual survey, its MetroCount device and its VivaCity device, and attributes this in part to the visibility limitations of the counting — noting in particular that riders travelling in groups, or temporarily obscured from view, may not be captured. This is an acknowledgement, in Council's own words, of the same limitation identified in this review: an AI video-recognition counter does not reliably detect every cyclist that passes, and under-counts to a degree that varies with conditions such as group riding and obstruction. Where the detection performance of the device is itself variable, a reported year-on-year change of the order of 15 per cent cannot confidently be distinguished from variation in what the device detects, as distinct from a real change in the number of cyclists. It is also relevant that, while Council operated a physical counter (the MetroCount device), this was used only for a one-week count at the Hobart Rivulet Linear Park entrance — a different location, and a point-in-time measurement rather than a year-on-year comparison. The conclusion that cycling has increased rests entirely on the VivaCity device, the reliability of which for this purpose Council's own report gives reason to question.

The direct manual survey evidence points the other way. Measured on a consistent manual-to-manual basis, cyclist volumes across the corridor were materially lower following installation than before it. On the evidence available, the objective of increasing the number of riders has not been demonstrated, and the

available direct measurements indicate a reduction in cyclist volumes along Collins Street over the trial period.

4.6 Corridor and Counter Location Observations

The 23 July 2026 survey, being a full directional count at three locations, provides two further observations relevant to the interpretation of the corridor's cycling function and to the reliability of the continuous counter.

- Cyclist volumes decrease along the corridor from south to north. On the surveyed day, two-way volumes fell from approximately 203 movements in the Molle–Barrack block to 136 in the Harrington–Murray block. This is consistent with the corridor being fed by cyclists entering from the South Hobart Rivulet Track at its southern end, with numbers reducing as cyclists reach the city and disperse. The continuous counter is located in the northernmost (Harrington–Murray) block, and therefore monitors the section of the corridor carrying the fewest cyclists.
- The continuous counter records only northbound movements in a single block. Southbound movements represent a material share of activity — between approximately 30 and 50 per cent of two-way volumes at the interior locations — and are not captured by the counter at all. Combined with its under-detection rate, this means the continuous counter monitors one direction, in one block, at the quietest end of the corridor, and detects roughly a quarter of even that movement. It is a useful indicator of trend, but it captures only a small fraction of total corridor cycling activity, and this should be borne in mind in any reliance on counter-derived figures — including Council's.

5. Traffic Network Performance

Traffic volume data was obtained for the Collins Street approaches and the intersecting cross-streets at the Barrack Street and Harrington Street intersections, comparing October 2024 (before installation) with October 2025 (after installation). Comparable data for the Molle Street intersection was obtained separately and is incorporated into the assessment below. The comparison is drawn on a consistent basis — the same month in successive years, avoiding seasonal distortion, and the same measurement method at each location.

5.1 Traffic Volumes on Collins Street

Vehicle volumes travelling through the corridor on Collins Street have fallen at both intersections since installation, as summarised in Table 3.

Table 3 Collins St through traffic volumes, Oct 2024 vs Oct 2025


Intersection	Direction	Oct 2024	Oct 2025	Change
Harrington Street	Northbound	3,302	3,068	–7%
	Southbound	2,124	1,635	–23%
	Two-way	5,426	4,703	–13%
Barrack Street	Northbound	1,649	1,371	–17%
	Southbound	1,415	1,417	0%
	Two-way	3,064	2,788	–9%

Two-way traffic on Collins Street fell by approximately 13 per cent at the Harrington Street intersection and 9 per cent at the Barrack Street intersection. Because traffic can enter and leave the corridor only at the signalised intersections, these reductions measured at the intersections apply equally to the intervening block volumes.

The reduction is consistent with the congestion arising from the removal of the turning lanes. The independent Road Safety Audit observed this congestion directly, noting that turning vehicles were blocking through traffic at both intersections and that following vehicles were running the intergreen as a result of the delays (audit finding 1.2). The reduction in through-traffic is the demand-side consequence of that congestion: vehicles are avoiding the corridor.


The hourly weekday traffic flow comparisons at the Barrack Street intersection between October 2024 and October 2025 are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Collins Street Traffic Flow Comparisons at Barrack Street, Oct 2024 vs Oct 2025



The hourly weekday traffic flow comparisons at the Harrington Street intersection between October 2024 and October 2025 are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Collins Street Traffic Flow Comparisons at Harrington Street, Oct 2024 vs Oct 2025



5.2 Redistribution of Traffic

A reduction in traffic on Collins Street does not, by itself, indicate that fewer trips are being made — the traffic may have redistributed to other parts of the network. To assess this, traffic volumes on the intersecting streets and on nearby parallel routes were examined for the same period. The results indicate that redistribution has occurred in different ways according to the function of each surrounding route.

5.2.1 Barrack Street

Barrack Street is a principal cross-city collector, carrying east–west traffic through and around the city, and is heavily used during peak periods. Cross-street through-traffic at the Barrack Street intersection increased by approximately 8 per cent between October 2024 and October 2025 (from approximately 10,500 to 11,400 vehicles per day).

This is consistent with traffic that would previously have used the Collins Street corridor diverting onto Barrack Street — a route better suited to cross-city movement — in response to the reduced attractiveness of Collins Street. The increase in traffic on Barrack Street is of note in its own right: Barrack Street was identified in the pre-installation assessment as an already-sensitive corridor, and the diversion of additional traffic onto it places further pressure on a route that is already congested at peak times.

5.2.2 Harrington Street

Harrington Street plays a different role in the network, carrying less traffic and typically feeding traffic into the city. Cross-street through-traffic at the Harrington Street intersection did not increase; it fell slightly, by approximately 3 per cent. This is a smaller change and, on its own, is within the range of normal year-to-year variation.

The absence of an increase is nonetheless informative. A substantial share of Harrington Street traffic historically turned into Collins Street at this intersection; the reduction in approach volume is consistent with a reduction in that turning demand — that is, with fewer drivers choosing to route onto Collins Street now that the corridor is less attractive. On this interpretation, the reductions on Collins Street and on the Harrington Street approach are two expressions of the same underlying change: a decline in demand for the Collins Street route.

5.2.3 Molle Street

Molle Street plays a role comparable to Barrack Street, providing east–west traffic movement through and around the city on the opposite side of the corridor (Molle Street operates one-way). Importantly, and unlike the Barrack, Harrington and Murray Street intersections, the Molle Street intersection was not subject to any lane changes under the trial. It therefore serves as a control: any change in through-traffic along Molle Street cannot be attributed to modifications at that intersection.

Through-traffic on Molle Street increased by approximately 8 per cent between October 2024 and October 2025 (from approximately 9,170 to 9,900 vehicles per day; a comparable increase is seen in the weekday figures). This increase, at an intersection where nothing was changed as a result of the Trial, is consistent with traffic diverting from the Collins Street corridor onto Molle Street — and it closely matches the 8 per cent increase observed on Barrack Street. The two principal east–west collector routes bracketing the

corridor have therefore both absorbed additional traffic in matched proportions, while Collins Street through-traffic has fallen.

The Molle Street data also allows the northbound traffic *entering* the Collins Street corridor at its southern end to be estimated. This traffic cannot be counted directly at the Molle Street approach, because it uses a shared through-and-right-turn lane whose movements are not separately detected. However, because the block between Molle Street and Barrack Street is a closed system — there are no intervening points at which traffic can enter or leave — the northbound traffic entering Collins Street at Molle Street must arrive at the Barrack Street intersection to the north. The northbound flow measured on the Collins Street approach to Barrack Street therefore provides a sound estimate of northbound entry into the corridor. On this basis, northbound entry into Collins Street fell from approximately 1,650 to 1,370 vehicles per day between October 2024 and October 2025 — a reduction of approximately 17 per cent.

This estimate is robust to the possibility of mid-block trips (a vehicle entering the corridor, parking, and later departing). Because Molle Street is one-way, a vehicle leaving a mid-block parking space cannot rationally return southward to its point of entry; the sensible path is to continue northbound and exit at Barrack Street. Any such trips, and any U-turn manoeuvres, therefore still pass the Barrack Street approach and are captured in the estimate.

The significance of this figure is that it measures demand for the corridor directly. While the through-traffic increases on Molle Street and Barrack Street show where displaced traffic has gone, the 17 per cent reduction in northbound entry shows that demand to use the Collins Street corridor itself has fallen substantially. This is consistent with the reduction in through-traffic on Collins Street (Section 4.2) and with the reduced turning demand inferred at Harrington Street: each is an expression of the same underlying change, a decline in the attractiveness of Collins Street as a route.

Taken together, the surrounding traffic data presents a consistent picture of redistribution following the reduction in capacity and attractiveness of Collins Street. The two principal east–west collector routes bracketing the corridor — Barrack Street and Molle Street — each recorded increases in through-traffic of approximately 8 per cent. Bathurst Street, which provides a nearby parallel northbound route through the CBD, recorded an increase of approximately 288 northbound vehicles per day, broadly comparable in magnitude with the reduction in northbound traffic recorded on Collins Street. At the same time, northbound demand to enter Collins Street fell by approximately 17 per cent and the Harrington Street feeder showed no increase. The traffic displaced from Collins Street has therefore not simply disappeared; the evidence indicates that it has redistributed across the surrounding network according to the function and available capacity of the alternative routes.

5.2.4 Bathurst Street

Bathurst Street provides a further indication of how traffic has redistributed within the surrounding network. For much of its length through the CBD, Bathurst Street operates one-way northbound and performs a broadly similar northbound traffic function to Collins Street. While Bathurst Street is two-way in the vicinity of the Harrington Street intersection, the northbound movement through this intersection provides a useful comparison with Collins Street without extending the analysis substantially further north into the CBD network.

Northbound traffic at the Bathurst Street / Harrington Street intersection increased by approximately 288 vehicles per day between October 2024 and October 2025, an increase of approximately 6 per cent. The hourly traffic profiles for the two periods are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 Bathurst St Northbound Traffic Flow Comparison at Harrington St Oct 2024 vs Oct 2025



The increase is concentrated almost entirely within the interpeak period. Morning and evening peak-hour flows are very similar between the two years, while traffic volumes through the middle of the day are consistently higher in October 2025. The data therefore demonstrates that use of a nearby parallel northbound route has increased following installation of the trial.

The magnitude of the increase is also notable. Northbound traffic on Collins Street fell by approximately 278 vehicles per day at Barrack Street and 234 vehicles per day at Harrington Street over the same comparison period. The approximately 288-vehicle increase on Bathurst Street is therefore of the same order as the reduction in northbound traffic using Collins Street. While the available data cannot establish that these are the same individual trips, the pattern is consistent with northbound traffic redistributing from Collins Street onto nearby alternative routes and provides further evidence that the reduction in Collins Street traffic represents redistribution within the network rather than a reduction in overall travel demand.

5.3 Suppression of Peak-Period Traffic Flow

The reduction in Collins Street traffic is not uniform across the day. Examination of the hourly traffic profiles shows that off-peak volumes are largely unchanged between October 2024 and October 2025, while the reductions are concentrated in the morning and evening peak periods. At the Barrack Street intersection,

for example, midday through-traffic (10:00 am to 3:00 pm) is essentially identical in the two years, while the morning and evening peak hours fell by 15 to 30 per cent. The same pattern is evident at Harrington Street, where the sharpest reductions occur in the peak hours and the off-peak reductions are comparatively small.

This pattern — flow that tracks the previous year through most of the day but is "clipped" during the peak — is characteristic of a capacity constraint rather than a general fall in demand. Where demand exceeds the reduced capacity of the single-lane approaches during the peak, the road is physically unable to pass the volume of traffic it previously carried, and the peak flow is suppressed. Off-peak, when demand is below capacity, no such suppression occurs and the volumes are unchanged. This can be seen clearly in Figure 2 and Figure 3.

This is a recognised phenomenon on the Hobart network, and one that has been documented before. Analysis undertaken for the Department of State Growth in 2016 recorded the same signature on several inner-city routes during a period of reduced network capacity, with peak-period flows suppressed below prior-year levels while off-peak flows were maintained — a "loss of capacity due to heavy congestion." That analysis noted that Hobart's road network operates consistently near capacity during peak periods, such that relatively small reductions in capacity produce disproportionately large impacts on peak traffic flow. The Collins Street data exhibits the same signature. The difference is the cause: in the 2016 case the capacity reduction arose from roadworks; here it arises from the removal of the turning lanes under the trial. The effect on peak-period traffic flow is the same.

5.4 Traffic Volumes and the Movement of People

The reduction in traffic on Collins Street has a further significance when considered against the objectives of the trial. A frequently-stated rationale for reallocating road space to cycling is that it will encourage a shift from private vehicle travel to cycling — that is, that the people no longer travelling by car will instead travel by bicycle, maintaining or increasing the total movement of people along the corridor.

The evidence does not support this having occurred on Collins Street. Traffic volumes have fallen, but cyclist volumes have not risen to compensate — as set out in Section 3, the manual survey evidence indicates that cyclist volumes have in fact fallen. The traffic that has left Collins Street has, on the evidence of the cross-street counts, largely redistributed to other routes or reflects a loss of corridor demand, rather than converting to cycling trips. The consequence is that the corridor is moving fewer people than before, not the same number by different means.

It is acknowledged that mode shift can take longer than a single year to establish, and may depend on the completeness of the surrounding cycling network rather than a single corridor. On the evidence available for this trial at this point, however, the anticipated shift from vehicle travel to cycling, and the maintenance of person-movement along the corridor that it would provide, has not been demonstrated.

6. In-Lane Bus Stop Operation

The trial relocated the northbound bus stop between Victoria Street and Murray Street (within the Harrington–Murray block) to an in-line configuration. An in-line stop sits within the through lane, so that a stopped bus blocks the single northbound traffic lane for the duration of each stop; following vehicles cannot pass without crossing to the opposing carriageway. The pre-installation assessment identified the potential for this configuration to disrupt traffic flow and to cause queuing on the approach to the adjacent intersection, and the independent Road Safety Audit identified an associated risk of vehicles crossing to the wrong side of the road to pass a stopped bus.

Bus passengers must also cross the cycle lane located between the bus stop and the footpath, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 In-Line Bus Stop



6.1 Appropriateness of an in-line bus stop in this location

In-line bus stops are not inherently inappropriate. Guidance treats the choice between an in-line stop and an indented bus bay as a context-dependent decision, and in-line stops are well suited to certain settings — high-frequency public transport corridors where minimising the delay of buses re-merging into traffic is important to service reliability; roads too narrow to accommodate an indented bay; low-traffic roads where a stopped bus causes little disruption; and residential or school environments where the slowing of other traffic is a deliberate traffic-calming benefit. In-lane bus stops are comparatively uncommon on Hobart's road network; the nearest comparable example is in Hill Street, West Hobart — a lower-volume residential street with an infrequent service, where the configuration falls squarely within the traffic-calming case and the resulting disruption to through traffic is minor and, in that context, benign.

The Collins Street location has none of the characteristics that make an in-line stop appropriate, and several that make it unsuitable. It is a two-way street in the CBD, not a residential or traffic-calming environment. The stop is not part of a high-frequency bus corridor that would justify prioritising bus re-merge time over general traffic; it is a single stop constructed in isolation, so the bus-priority rationale for an in-line configuration does not apply. It is located on the single-lane approach toward the Murray Street intersection, where a stopped bus blocking the only through lane prevents traffic from progressing. And it carries CBD traffic volumes with limited overtaking opportunity. Austroads guidance recognises that bus stops located within through lanes create a disruption to through traffic and can lead to driver frustration and increased risk-taking by way of overtaking a stationary bus — precisely the outcome the Road Safety Audit observed at this location. The in-line configuration here is, in effect, a consequence of the reduced carriageway width arising from the bicycle lanes rather than a positive design choice suited to the setting; there is insufficient width to provide an indented bay that would allow buses to pull clear of the through lane.

6.2 Survey of operational impact

To quantify the operational impact, a 12-hour survey of the in-line stop was undertaken on 23 July 2026 (7:00 am to 7:00 pm), recording the dwell time of each bus and the number of northbound vehicles queued behind it on departure.

6.2.1 Bus frequency and dwell time

The stop was used on 78 occasions over the 12-hour period, an average of approximately 6.5 buses per hour, rising to 12 buses in the busiest hour (8:00–9:00 am) — a bus approximately every five minutes during the morning peak. On each occasion the single northbound lane was blocked for the duration of the stop.

Dwell times are summarised in Table 4. The average dwell was 26 seconds and the median 20 seconds; however, dwells of 30 seconds or more occurred at 29 per cent of stops, and the longest observed dwell was 73 seconds. Longer dwells are associated with services requiring extended boarding and alighting, including the airport service, which the Road Safety Audit separately noted takes longer owing to baggage handling.

Table 4 In-Lane bus stop dwell times

Measure	Value
Average dwell	26 seconds
Median dwell	20 seconds
85th percentile dwell	45 seconds
Maximum dwell	73 seconds
Stops of 30 seconds or more	29%
Stops of 45 seconds or more	17%

6.2.2 Queuing Impact

Because the stop blocks the through lane, each bus stop generates a queue of northbound vehicles held behind it. The survey recorded a mean queue of 3.7 vehicles behind each stopped bus, with a maximum of 12. A queue of five or more vehicles formed at 27 per cent of stops, and a queue of four or more at 38 per cent. Queue lengths are summarised in Table 5. It should be noted that the survey was undertaken during school holidays (as was the Road Safety Audit inspection), so the volumes recorded do not reflect peak-term conditions. The queuing impact during normal term-time operation would be expected to be greater.

Table 5 Northbound queue behind stopped bus

Measure	Value
Mean queue	3.7 vehicles
Median queue	3 vehicles
85th percentile queue	7 vehicles
Maximum queue	12 vehicles
Stops producing a queue of 5+ vehicles	27%

6.2.3 Assessment

The survey confirms that the in-line stop has a material and repeated effect on northbound traffic flow. The single through lane is blocked on average more than six times per hour throughout the day — and up to twelve times per hour in the morning peak — holding several vehicles behind each stopped bus. This occurs on the approach to the Murray Street intersection, so that queuing from a stopped bus can interact with the signal operation at that intersection.

The safety consequence follows directly from the operational one. With the through lane blocked and no legal means of passing, the Road Safety Audit observed vehicles crossing to the opposing carriageway to pass stopped buses, creating a risk of head-on collision. The dwell and queue data explain why: with a bus blocking the lane for 30 seconds or more at nearly a third of stops, and a queue of five or more vehicles forming behind more than a quarter of stopped buses, the pressure on following drivers to undertake this manoeuvre is both frequent and predictable.

This is one of the matters identified in the pre-installation assessment, and the survey evidence confirms that the in-line stop disrupts traffic flow and generates queuing on the intersection approach, consistent with what was anticipated.

7. Road Safety Performance

7.1 Preamble

Road safety was a central consideration in the trial, both in Council's stated objectives and in the concerns raised prior to installation. Council's Twelve-Month Post-Installation report concludes that "*total crashes have reduced since before the trial*" and characterises the change in cyclist crashes as "*a minor increase ... [that] corresponds with increased cycling activity*". This section examines the crash record for the corridor and assesses whether those conclusions are supported.

The assessment draws on the complete Building Tasmania (formerly Department of State Growth) crash record for Collins Street between Molle Street and Murray Street, spanning February 2019 to June 2026 — over six years of pre-installation data and approximately one year of post-installation data. It is supported by the findings of an independent Post-Opening Road Safety Audit.

7.2 Basis of the Crash Comparison

Two matters of method are addressed before the findings are presented.

Standardisation. The pre-installation and post-installation periods are of very different lengths — approximately 6.3 years and 1.1 years respectively. Comparing raw totals between periods of unequal length would be misleading. Crash figures in this section are therefore expressed as an annual rate (crashes per year) so that the two periods can be compared on a consistent basis. The small number of crashes involved is a limitation, discussed in Section 7.13.

The date of the pre/ post boundary. Defining a single boundary between the pre-installation and post-installation periods is not straightforward, because the trial was implemented in stages rather than on a single date:

- Construction commenced in approximately March 2025, over a period of some six weeks (per Council's project information);
- The infrastructure — including the separated lanes and the concrete separator elements — was substantially in place and in use in at least the southern section of the corridor by 22 May 2025, as established by the crash of that date (Section 7.3);
- The trial was officially opened on 30 May 2025; and
- Council adopted 1 June 2025 as the start of its trial-year reporting period.

This assessment adopts 1 May 2025 as the boundary between the pre-installation and post-installation periods. This date is chosen because it precedes each of the implementation milestones above and therefore provides clean twelve-month comparison years; because it ensures that crashes arising from the trial infrastructure are attributed to the post-installation period rather than the pre-installation baseline; and because it is a neutral, round date not selected to produce any particular result. The term "post-

installation" is used throughout, referring to the period in which the infrastructure was in place, rather than to the official opening or reporting dates.

The choice of boundary is, in any event, not material to the findings. As shown below, the results hold under every reasonable boundary date. The only crash whose attribution is sensitive to the choice is the injury crash of 22 May 2025, and the physical evidence that it was caused by the trial infrastructure (Section 6.5) places it unambiguously in the post-installation period. The three property-damage-only crashes recorded during the March 2025 construction window are conservatively retained in the pre-installation baseline, notwithstanding that the corridor was already under construction when they occurred.


7.3 Total and Severity Comparison

Table 6 sets out the crash record by severity for the pre- and post-installation periods, standardised to an annual rate. The crash history by year categorised by total crashes, pedestrian and cyclist crashes is shown in Figure 6.

Table 6 Reported crashes by severity, standardised to crashes per year

Severity	Pre-installation (6.2 yrs)	Per year	Post-installation (1.2 yrs)	Per year
Serious injury	2	0.32	0	0.00
Minor injury	8	1.28	2	1.71
First aid	2	0.32	1	0.86
Property damage only	62	9.95	11	9.43
All injury crashes	12	1.93	3	2.57
Total crashes	74	11.88	14	12.00

Figure 6 Reported total, pedestrian and cyclist crashes by year



Three important observations follow from the standardised comparison.

Total crashes are essentially unchanged. The pre-installation crash rate was approximately 11.9 crashes per year, and the post-installation rate is approximately 12.0 per year. On a standardised basis there is no reduction in total crashes; the two rates are effectively identical. Council's conclusion that "total crashes have reduced since before the trial" appears to rest on a comparison with the single pre-trial year 2024–2025, which at 14 recorded crashes was among the highest in the record and is not representative of the longer-term average. Figure 6 illustrates this: the post-installation total sits within the normal range of year-to-year variation seen across the pre-installation period, not below it. Measured against the full six-year pre-installation history, total crashes have not reduced.

Serious injuries have not increased. No serious-injury crashes have been recorded in the post-installation period. This is stated plainly: the trial is not associated with an increase in crashes at the most severe end of the scale, and this should be given due weight.

Injury crashes have risen. The annual rate of injury crashes increased from approximately 1.9 to 2.6 per year. This increase rests on a small number of crashes and should not be over-interpreted (Section 7.5). Its composition, however, is significant, and is the subject of the next section.

7.4 The Emergence of Cyclist Crashes

The most material change in the crash record is not in the total, but in the type of crashes occurring. In over six years of pre-installation data, the record contains a single crash involving a bicycle — a property-damage-only crash in June 2020. There were **no** injury crashes involving cyclists in the entire pre-installation period.

In the approximately one year since installation, there have been four crashes involving cyclists, of which two involved injury:

- 22 May 2025 — minor injury — cyclist struck a concrete separator slab in the bicycle lane and fell;
- 23 June 2025 — property damage only;
- 6 December 2025 — property damage only;
- 8 December 2025 — minor injury — cyclist struck by vehicle emerging from a driveway.

Cyclist crashes have therefore gone from a rate of approximately one in the six years before installation to four in the first year of the post-installation period, and cyclist *injury* crashes — of which there were none in the pre-installation record — now account for two of the three injury crashes recorded during the post-installation period. The increase in the overall injury rate identified in Section 7.2 is, in effect, entirely attributable to the appearance of this new category of crash.

This is a more precise and more significant finding than a change in the total. A class of crash that was essentially absent from the corridor for six years has appeared following the installation of the infrastructure. The two injury crashes are directly associated with the trial environment — one involving a collision with a separator slab, and one involving the emerging-from-driveway conflict that the changed kerbside arrangement introduces.

7.5 Cyclist Crash 22nd May 2025

The crash of 22 May 2025 warrants specific attention. The police narrative records that the cyclist entered the bicycle lane, struck one of the concrete separator slabs, came off the bicycle and sustained injury. The bicycle lane and the separator slabs did not exist prior to the installation; their presence on 22 May 2025 confirms that the infrastructure was in place and in use eight days before the official opening on 30 May 2025.

The significance of this is twofold. First, it confirms that the trial infrastructure was in place and in use before the official opening date, which is why this assessment adopts a boundary (1 May 2025) that precedes the opening and treats the crash as post-installation. Second, and more importantly, this crash — an injury crash caused by the trial infrastructure itself — falls before Council's chosen reporting window of 1 June 2025 to 31 May 2026, and is therefore recorded by Council within the *pre-trial* period. The effect is that a crash caused by the trial infrastructure is counted against the pre-installation baseline rather than the post-installation period. This simultaneously understates the post-installation cyclist crash count and overstates the pre-installation figure. Correctly attributed, the post-installation period records four cyclist crashes, not three, and the pre-installation cyclist injury record remains at zero.

The sensitivity of the crash attribution to the boundary date is limited to this single crash. Under every boundary date that precedes the official opening — whether the construction start in March 2025, 1 May 2025, or the 22 May date on which the infrastructure is known to have been in use — the post-installation period records four cyclist crashes and two cyclist injury crashes. Only Council's convention of commencing the trial year on 1 June 2025 excludes the 22 May crash, and it does so notwithstanding that the crash was caused by infrastructure that was already installed and operating. The finding of an emergent cyclist crash type is therefore robust to the choice of boundary; it is Council's specific boundary, and only that boundary, that obscures it.

7.6 Parking Related Crashes

A further change in the crash record concerns crashes associated with parking. For this analysis, parking-related crashes are defined as those classified under the following Definitions for Coding Accidents (DCA) codes: 142 (leaving parking), 144 (parking vehicles only), 160 (parked), and 163 (vehicle door). These codes capture crashes arising from parking manoeuvres, parked vehicles and the opening of vehicle doors.

Standardised to an annual rate on the 1 May 2025 boundary, parking-related crashes have increased following installation as shown in Table 7.

Table 7 Standardised Annual Parking Crash Rates

	Pre-installation (6.2 years)	Post installation (1.2 years)
Parking related crashes	15 crashes	7 crashes
Annual parking crash rate	2.4 crashes per year	6.0 crashes per year

The annual rate of parking-related crashes has approximately doubled. (Adopting a broader definition that also includes parallel-lane side-swipe crashes adjacent to parking does not change the direction of the finding; the increase holds under either definition.) As with the other crash findings, the post-installation figure rests on a small number of crashes, and all but one were of property-damage-only severity, the exception being a single first-aid crash. The finding is one of frequency rather than severity.

7.6.1 Significance against reduced parking exposure

The increase is notable because of what would ordinarily be expected. The trial removed a substantial quantity of on-street parking along the corridor. Council's stated figure at the time of the pre-installation assessment was 44 on-street spaces. A reduction in parking supply reduces the number of parking manoeuvres and the number of parked vehicles, and would, on the basis of reduced exposure alone, be expected to produce a *decrease* in parking-related crashes. Instead, such crashes have increased.

That parking crashes have risen despite both a reduction in parking activity and a reduction in adjacent traffic volumes — each of which would independently be expected to lower crash exposure — indicates an increase in the risk associated with each parking manoeuvre. This is consistent with the mechanism identified independently by the Road Safety Audit and anticipated in the pre-installation assessment: the

reduced carriageway width, the positioning of parking immediately adjacent to the traffic lane, the substandard buffer between parking and the bicycle lane, and the additional roadside infrastructure have increased the complexity of parking manoeuvres and reduced the operating space available to vehicles.

It should be noted that the removal of parking occurred in stages over the course of the trial — parking between Harrington Street and Murray Street was removed only recently, with the Stage 2 works. The reduction in parking exposure was therefore not uniform across the corridor throughout the post-installation period. For this reason, the finding is expressed as a directional one — a reduction in parking supply accompanied by an increase, rather than the expected decrease, in parking-related crashes — rather than as a precise crash rate per parking space.

7.6.2 Emergence of dooring crash

One post-installation crash warrants specific mention. On 16 February 2026, the first crash classified as a vehicle-door (dooring) crash in the entire crash record occurred on Collins Street. In the six years of pre-installation data, no dooring crash was recorded.

This is the specific crash type that the Road Safety Audit identified as a risk arising from the substandard buffer between the bicycle lane and the on-street parking (audit finding 1.1, which noted the buffer of 0.5–0.7 metres against the 1.0 metre separation specified in Austroads Guide to Road Design Part 3 to provide clearance for car doors), and that the pre-installation assessment had flagged as a consequence of the reduced kerbside operating space. While a single crash cannot establish a trend, the appearance of this specific crash type — absent for six years and predicted by both the independent audit and the pre-installation assessment — is consistent with the mechanism those documents identified.

7.7 Independent Road Safety Audit

The findings above are consistent with, and corroborated by, the independent Post-Opening Road Safety Audit undertaken for the corridor. The audit, conducted in accordance with the Austroads *Guide to Road Safety Part 6: Road Safety Audits* (2022), identified a series of safety deficiencies associated with the trial configuration, several of which relate directly to the cyclist crash types now appearing in the record. These include the risk of dooring arising from the substandard buffer between the bicycle lane and parked vehicles, the conflict between cyclists and loading activity where forklifts must occupy the bicycle lane, the risk of cyclists striking or falling at the in-line bus stop, the striking hazard presented by the unsecured planter boxes, and the striking and trip hazards presented by the concrete lane separators, which the audit found were not clearly visible in dark conditions.

The audit also identified risks arising from the removal of the dedicated turn lanes — the same turn-lane removals examined in the traffic performance assessment (Section 4). It observed congestion at the Harrington Street and Barrack Street intersections, with turning vehicles blocking through traffic and vehicles running the intergreen phase as a result of the delays, and rated the associated risk of cross-traffic collision as High. The most severe finding of the audit — rated Extreme, with a fatal-severity potential — concerned the inability of buses to complete the left turn from Barrack Street into Collins Street without crossing the centreline, a consequence of the centreline relocation required to accommodate the trial.

That an independent audit, applying a recognised national methodology, identified these risks provides external support for the safety concerns raised in this review, and indicates that the crash record to date reflects hazards inherent in the trial configuration rather than isolated events.

7.8 Bus Turning Movements and Swept Paths

A significant road safety issue identified following installation, and one not raised in the pre-installation assessment, concerns the ability of buses to physically complete their turning movements into Collins Street.

This matter was not anticipated in the January 2025 assessment because a swept-path assessment is a fundamental design check that would ordinarily be undertaken as part of the design of any works affecting the geometry available to buses, and it was reasonable to assume such a check had been carried out. The independent Road Safety Audit indicates that the trial geometry does not, in fact, accommodate the swept paths of buses turning into Collins Street.

A bus negotiating a turn from Harrington Street into Collins Street is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7 Bus Turning at Harrington Street



The Road Safety Audit undertook swept-path assessments of the bus movements at the Barrack Street and Harrington Street intersections, comparing the pre-installation and post-installation geometry (provided in Appendix 3 of the RSA). The assessments identify two issues.

- Barrack Street left turn (rated Extreme). Buses turn left from Barrack Street into the northbound lane of Collins Street. To accommodate the separated left-turn lane introduced by the trial, the centreline of Collins Street was relocated, reducing the width of the northbound departure lane by approximately one metre. The swept-path assessment establishes that, prior to the works, buses could complete this turn from the central lane; following the works, buses can no longer complete the turn without crossing the centreline into the opposing (southbound) lane. The audit identifies the consequent risk that a turning bus will strike a vehicle held at the Collins Street stop line, or mount the kerb to avoid such a vehicle and strike a pedestrian waiting at the crossing. The audit rated this finding Extreme, with a potential crash severity of fatal — the most severe rating assigned in the entire audit.
- Harrington Street right turn (rated Medium). Buses turn right from Harrington Street into the northbound lane of Collins Street from the central lane, and were observed to slow significantly to complete the turn. The swept-path assessment identifies a risk of buses side-swiping roadside furniture or southbound vehicles at the Collins Street hold line, and of rear-end collisions involving following vehicles on Harrington Street not expecting a bus to slow to that degree.

Two aspects of this finding warrant emphasis.

First, the severity. The Barrack Street finding is the only Extreme-rated finding in the Road Safety Audit, and the only one carrying a potential crash severity of fatal. It is not a matter of operational inconvenience but of a turning movement that cannot be completed within the available carriageway, on a movement undertaken by buses many times each day.

Second, the implication for the adequacy of the design. The swept-path conflict is a direct geometric consequence of the trial works, specifically, the relocation of the Collins Street centreline to accommodate the left-turn lane, and the reduction in departure-lane width that resulted. A swept-path assessment is a routine and standard element of designing any change to intersection geometry that affects the movements of buses or other large vehicles.

That the trial was constructed with geometry that does not accommodate these movements, and that the conflict was identified only through a swept-path assessment undertaken as part of an independent post-opening audit, indicates that such an assessment was either not undertaken or not acted upon during the design of the trial. The emergence of an Extreme-rated conflict from a geometric check that would ordinarily be undertaken at design stage is itself an indicator of the adequacy of the design development that preceded installation.

This finding is distinct from the operational impact of the in-line bus stop, addressed in the network performance assessment (Section 6). The two are separate matters: the in-line stop concerns the disruption a stopped bus causes to through traffic, while the swept-path finding concerns the ability of buses to physically complete their turns into the corridor without conflict.

7.9 Zebra Crossing and Victoria Street Conflict

The trial introduced a new zebra (pedestrian) crossing on Collins Street, located immediately south of the Victoria Street junction. Victoria Street provides the exit from the Centrepark car park, and is therefore a regularly-used egress point rather than a minor side street. The placement of the crossing at this location has created a conflict between crossing pedestrians and vehicles turning out of Victoria Street, which the independent Road Safety Audit identified and which site observations confirm.

Figure 8 Zebra Crossing Installation



7.9.1 Insufficient Storage between Victoria St and Crossing

A vehicle turning right out of Victoria Street onto Collins Street must cross the northbound carriageway and enter the southbound carriageway, heading back toward Molle Street. The right-turn exit from Victoria Street is approximately 3 metres from the zebra crossing. As a typical passenger vehicle is of the order of 5 metres in length, it is physically impossible for a vehicle to complete this turn and come to rest clear of the crossing while remaining within the southbound carriageway: the available storage between the crossing and the intersection is shorter than the vehicle itself.

The consequence is that a vehicle turning out of Victoria Street while a pedestrian is on the crossing has nowhere to wait. It must either encroach onto the crossing, or prop across the carriageway partially blocking through traffic, exposed to vehicles approaching on both Collins Street approaches.

Figure 8 shows this occurring: a vehicle turning from Victoria Street has blocked both lanes before moving across the zebra crossing after a pedestrian has passed, with vehicles approaching on both approaches.

This is the conflict identified by the Road Safety Audit, which found that a vehicle turning right out of Victoria Street while a pedestrian is on the crossing will prop, partially blocking north-eastbound traffic, and is at risk of being struck by a through vehicle. The audit recommended relocating the crossing to the south-west to provide storage for at least one vehicle between the crossing and Victoria Street. The 3-metre separation confirms, on a geometric basis, that the current arrangement provides no such storage.

The placement of the crossing also increases the complexity of the turning movement out of Victoria Street. A driver exiting the car park must simultaneously judge gaps in traffic on both Collins Street approaches and monitor the crossing for pedestrians, within a very short distance. General site observations indicate frequent hesitation by pedestrians at the crossing, consistent with uncertainty as to whether turning and approaching vehicles will give way — an indication that the interaction is not operating as a pedestrian crossing should.

7.9.2 Vehicle Speeds on the Crossing

The Road Safety Audit separately identified that, although the crossing lies within the 30 km/h speed-limit zone, vehicles under free-flow conditions were observed travelling faster than the posted limit, posing a risk to pedestrians on the crossing in the event of a collision. The audit rated this risk High. The combination of a crossing placed with inadequate storage, at the exit of a major car park, and subject to vehicle speeds above the posted limit, represents a pedestrian-safety concern that was avoidable in the positioning of the crossing.

7.10 Geometric Constraints and Installation Hazards

The issues identified in this review — the crashes involving cyclists, the parking-related crashes, the bus swept-path conflicts, and the zebra-crossing conflict — share a common underlying cause: Collins Street is a narrow corridor, and accommodating separated bicycle lanes within it has required compromising the space available to the other elements of the street. A road of this width does not readily accommodate two-way traffic, on-street parking, and separated bicycle lanes simultaneously. Fitting all of these into the available width has been achieved only by reducing dimensions below the relevant design standards, and the resulting compromises have themselves introduced hazards to cyclists and pedestrians.

Reduced Buffer to Parked Vehicles

The separation between the bicycle lane and the adjacent on-street parking has been reduced to approximately 0.5–0.7 metres, below the 1.0 metre specified in Austroads Guide to Road Design Part 3 to provide clearance for opening car doors. The Road Safety Audit identified this as a dooring risk (finding 1.1), and the consequence is measurable in the crash record: the parking-related crashes have increased since installation, and the first dooring crash in the corridor's recorded history occurred during the trial period (Section 6.6.2).

Physical Separators within a Constrained Cross-Section

Because the cross-section is constrained, rigid physical separators have been placed to delineate the bicycle lane close to the paths of both cyclists and vehicles. These present a striking hazard to cyclists: the cyclist injury crash of 22 May 2025 involved a rider striking a concrete separator and falling, resulting in injury (Section 6.5).

The Road Safety Audit identified this striking risk, noting that cyclists entering between the separators may strike them. The audit further noted that the concrete separators present a trip hazard to pedestrians crossing mid-block, a risk heightened at night given that the separators were found not to be clearly visible in dark conditions (finding 1.17).

The Road Safety Audit noted that the separators used elsewhere along the corridor were unsecured and had shifted from their original positions, and were not reflective at night (findings 1.10 and 1.11). Rigid separators placed within the operating space of cyclists are a hazard that a less constrained design would avoid.

An example of the concrete separators are shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9 Concrete Wheel Stop Separators



The Road Safety Audit noted that the separators used elsewhere along the corridor were unsecured and had shifted from their original positions, and were not reflective at night (findings 1.10 and 1.11). Rigid

separators placed within the operating space of cyclists are a hazard that a less constrained design would avoid.

Abrupt Lane Deviations from Staggered Parking

To retain parking within the constrained width, the on-street parking alternates between sides of the corridor, and the traffic lane is required to deviate laterally around each parking arrangement. The Road Safety Audit observed that these lateral shifts are relatively abrupt for the posted speed limit and may be difficult for drivers to negotiate, creating a risk of side-swipe and off-carriageway crashes (finding 1.16). The deviations are not smooth transitions but are dictated by the placement of the parking, and their abrupt and repeated nature adds to the complexity of the driving task along the corridor. The line marking transitions can be seen in Figure 7, where the original centreline appears as a blacked out line through the road.

Taken together, these are not isolated defects but the consequences of accommodating a design within a road width that cannot properly support it. Where design standards have been compromised — in the buffer to parked vehicles, in the placement of separators, and in the geometry of the lane deviations — the effect is measurable in the crash record, in the increase in parking-related crashes and in the emergence of cyclist crashes on a corridor that had recorded almost none before the trial.

7.11 Predicted and Observed Road Safety Outcomes

The concerns examined in this review are not new. In January 2025, prior to the installation of the trial, Midson Traffic prepared an independent technical assessment of the proposed scheme (the "pre-installation assessment"). That assessment identified a number of specific risks to road safety, traffic operation, parking and network performance, and questioned whether the design would achieve its intended outcomes.

This section sets out the principal matters raised in the pre-installation assessment alongside the outcomes now observed. It is presented as a factual comparison. In each case, a specific concern was identified and documented before the trial proceeded, and in each case the subsequent evidence is consistent with the concern that was raised.

Table 8 Predicted and Observed Road Safety Outcomes

Matter	Identified prior to installation	Observed following installation
Traffic congestion from turn-lane removal	The removal of turning lanes would leave a single lane on the Collins Street approaches at Barrack and Harrington Streets, at intersections already operating at or near saturation, increasing queues and delay.	The independent Road Safety Audit observed congestion at both intersections, with turning vehicles blocking through traffic and vehicles running the intergreen as a result of the delays. Vehicle through-volumes on Collins Street fell by 9–13%.
Increased intersection crashes	The removal of approach turn lanes and the resulting mixed queues would increase the risk of rear-end and angle crashes at the signalised intersections.	The Road Safety Audit rated the risk of cross-traffic collision from intergreen-running as High.
New cyclist conflict points	Notwithstanding the negligible pre-existing bicycle crash history, new conflict points would be introduced at bus stops and intersection bicycle-lane treatments, and reduced parking would increase the likelihood of vehicles stopping in the carriageway, creating dooring-type conflicts.	Cyclist crashes rose from one in the six years before installation to four in the first year, two involving injury — the first cyclist injury crashes recorded on the corridor. The Road Safety Audit independently identified dooring, bus-stop and loading conflicts.
Traffic redistribution rather than mode shift	The design would "not improve congestion or provide significant mode shift attractiveness"; the corridor already accommodated its (predominantly commuter) cyclists safely in a low-speed, low-volume environment.	Vehicle volumes fell on Collins Street while traffic increased on the surrounding network — including approximately 6% increases on Barrack Street and Molle Street and an increase of approximately 288 northbound vehicles per day on Bathurst Street. Cyclist volumes did not increase; the manual surveys record a reduction.
Corridor serves South Hobart, not CBD distribution	Bicycle survey data showed the highest volumes at the Molle Street (Rivulet Track) end, declining toward Murray Street, indicating the route primarily serves South Hobart connections;	The July 2026 survey confirms the same pattern: volumes highest at the southern end and declining northward, strongly weekday and northbound.

	usage was strongly commuter-focused and predominantly northbound.	
Loss of on-street parking and business access	Removal of approximately 44 high-turnover on-street spaces would reduce accessibility for short-term business visitors, impair loading and servicing, and could not be offset by off-street facilities.	The Road Safety Audit identified loading displacement, delivery drivers crossing the carriageway, and forklift/ cyclist conflict arising from the loss of kerbside space.
In-lane bus stop operational impact	The conversion to an in-lane bus stop would disrupt traffic flow during boarding, create cyclist/ passenger conflicts, and cause queuing on the approach to Harrington Street.	The 23 July 2026 survey recorded the in-lane stop blocking the single northbound lane approximately 6–7 times per hour, queuing a mean of 3.7 vehicles (up to 12 vehicles) behind each stopped bus, with individual blockages of up to 73 seconds. The Road Safety Audit separately observed vehicles crossing to the opposite carriageway to pass stopped buses.
Pressure on the Barrack Street corridor	The design would place increased pressure on the "already sensitive" Barrack Street corridor, with cascade potential across the wider network.	Cross-street through-traffic on Barrack Street increased by approximately 8%, consistent with traffic diverting onto an already-congested collector route.

7.12 Observations

The correspondence between the matters identified before installation and the outcomes observed after it is close. The pre-installation assessment did not predict every detail, and some matters — for example, the specific magnitude of the cyclist crash increase — were framed as risks rather than certainties. Equally, some outcomes are more firmly established than others, and the limitations noted in the relevant sections of this report apply.

Nonetheless, the central concerns raised in January 2025 — that the removal of turn lanes would create congestion and redistribute traffic without achieving mode shift, that new cyclist conflict points would be introduced to a corridor with no material cyclist crash history, that the loss of kerbside space would impair business access and servicing, and that the in-lane bus stop and turn-lane removals would create operational and safety problems — have each been borne out by the subsequent evidence, including by an independent Road Safety Audit applying a recognised national methodology.

These were not unforeseeable outcomes. They were identified, in specific terms, in a technical assessment provided prior to the decision to proceed. The value of documenting them here is not retrospective, but

forward-looking: the same evidence that now confirms these concerns is the evidence on which decisions about the future of the trial should be based.

7.13 Limitations

Two limitations apply to the crash findings and are stated openly.

First, the number of crashes involved is small, particularly in the post-installation period, which comprises approximately one year of data. Year-to-year variation in crash numbers is inherent, and a single year cannot establish a trend to the level of statistical certainty that a longer period would allow. The findings above are expressed with that limitation in mind. It is relevant, however, that the key finding does not rest on a marginal change in a fluctuating total, but on the appearance of a category of crash — cyclist injury crashes — that was absent from the corridor throughout the pre-installation record.

Second, reported crash data is subject to under-reporting, and cyclist crashes in particular are known to be under-reported. It is possible that heightened attention to the corridor during the trial has improved reporting rates. This cannot, however, account for the emergence of cyclist injury crashes from a six-year base of zero, nor for a crash in which the striking object was a piece of the trial infrastructure.

8. Vehicle Emissions

A benefit commonly attributed to reallocating road space from general traffic to cycling is a reduction in vehicle emissions. This section provides a high-level assessment of whether the trial is likely to have delivered that benefit on the Collins Street corridor. It is not a detailed emissions model; rather, it draws together the traffic findings of this review to establish the likely direction of the change.

Vehicle emissions are broadly a function of two things: how far vehicles travel, and how efficiently they travel — with stop-start conditions, idling and queuing producing more emissions per kilometre than free-flowing travel. On both measures, the evidence assembled in this review points away from an emissions reduction.

8.1 Additional Delay along the Corridor

The removal of the turning lanes has increased delay for vehicles travelling through the Collins Street corridor. Intersection modelling shows increased average delay per vehicle across the affected movements at the Barrack Street and Harrington Street intersections, and the independent Road Safety Audit observed this congestion directly — turning vehicles blocking through traffic, and vehicles running the intergreen as a result of the delays. The trial has also introduced additional points at which vehicles must stop or slow along the corridor: the in-line bus stop, which blocks the single northbound lane on average more than six times per hour (Section 5), and the new zebra crossing near Victoria Street. Each of these increases the amount of stopping, idling and queuing experienced by vehicles using the corridor, and therefore the emissions produced per vehicle.

8.2 Traffic Diverted onto already Congested Routes

The traffic that has left Collins Street has not disappeared. As established in Section 4, there is strong evidence that it has redistributed onto the surrounding network. Through-traffic on Barrack Street and Molle Street, the two east-west collector routes bracketing the corridor, increased by approximately 8 per cent each, while northbound traffic on Bathurst Street — a nearby parallel northbound route — increased by approximately 288 vehicles per day. The redistribution is therefore evident both on the cross-city routes surrounding Collins Street and on a parallel route serving a similar northbound movement.

8.3 Assessment

Taken together, these findings indicate that the trial is unlikely to have reduced vehicle emissions, and has more likely increased them across the network. Vehicles using the Collins Street corridor experience more delay and more stop-start operation, which increases emissions per vehicle; and the traffic displaced from the corridor has been redistributed onto adjacent routes that are already congested, adding vehicle travel and delay elsewhere rather than removing it. The reduction that a genuine shift from vehicle travel to cycling would have produced has not been realised, because — as set out in Section 3 — that shift has not occurred; cyclist volumes have fallen rather than risen.

This is a high-level assessment, and a precise quantification of the emissions change is beyond its scope. The direction of the change, however, is clear on the evidence available: the trial has not delivered the emissions reduction commonly associated with cycling infrastructure, and the balance of evidence points to an increase.

9. Conclusions

This review has assessed the performance of the Collins Street bicycle lane trial against its intended outcomes, drawing on the traffic, cyclist and crash data now available for the corridor, an independent Road Safety Audit, and the manual surveys undertaken for this review. The principal findings are drawn together below.

9.1 Cyclist Volumes

The trial has not been shown to increase cycling on Collins Street. Comparison of the November 2024 pre-installation survey with the manual survey undertaken in July 2026 — the two being measured on a consistent, like-for-like basis — indicates that cyclist volumes have fallen at every location and in both directions, with the single exception of a small induced southbound movement at the northern end of the corridor. The reduction is evident notwithstanding that the July survey was undertaken in a lower-cycling season, which would tend to understate rather than overstate the change.

Council's conclusion that cycling increased by 15 per cent rests on a single-month comparison derived from an uncalibrated AI video-recognition counter. The equivalent counter examined in this review was found not to reliably measure actual cyclist volumes. On the direct, manual survey evidence, the objective of increasing the number of riders has not been demonstrated, and the available measurements indicate a reduction.

9.2 Traffic Network Performance

Traffic volumes travelling through Collins Street have fallen since installation — by approximately 13 per cent at the Harrington Street intersection and 9 per cent at Barrack Street — with the reductions concentrated in the peak periods, a pattern characteristic of a capacity constraint rather than a general fall in demand. This traffic has not disappeared: through-traffic on the two east-west collector routes bracketing the corridor, Barrack Street and Molle Street, increased by approximately 6 per cent each, while northbound traffic on nearby parallel Bathurst Street increased by approximately 288 vehicles per day. Northbound demand to enter Collins Street itself fell by approximately 17 per cent. Taken together, the data provides strong evidence that traffic previously using Collins Street has redistributed across the surrounding network rather than being removed through mode shift.

The consequence is that the corridor is moving fewer people than before. The reduction in vehicle traffic has not been matched by an increase in cycling — cyclist volumes have also fallen — so the shift from private vehicle travel to cycling on which the reallocation of road space was premised has not, on the evidence available, occurred.

9.3 Road Safety

Standardised for the different lengths of the pre- and post-installation periods, total crashes are essentially unchanged (approximately 11.9 per year before installation and 12.0 per year after), and Council's

conclusion that total crashes have reduced is not supported when measured against the full pre-installation history rather than the single highest pre-trial year. Serious-injury crashes have not increased.

The most significant change is in the type of crashes occurring. A category of crash that was essentially absent from the corridor for six years — crashes involving cyclists, including injury crashes — has appeared following installation, with four cyclist crashes in the first year, two of them involving injury. Parking-related crashes have also increased, notwithstanding a reduction in both parking supply and adjacent traffic volumes that would ordinarily be expected to reduce them; and the first vehicle-door crash in the corridor's recorded history occurred during the trial. These outcomes are consistent with the hazards identified by the independent Road Safety Audit and with the constrained geometry of the installation, in which design standards — including the buffer between the bicycle lane and parked vehicles — have been compromised to fit the design within the available road width.

The Road Safety Audit further identified an Extreme-rated conflict in the inability of buses to complete the turn from Barrack Street into Collins Street without crossing the centreline, together with conflicts at the in-line bus stop and the new zebra crossing. The in-line bus stop, surveyed for this review, was found to block the single northbound traffic lane on average more than six times per hour.

The audit also identified the concrete lane separators as a hazard, presenting a striking risk to cyclists and a trip hazard to pedestrians crossing mid-block, the latter heightened at night where the separators were found not to be clearly visible in dark conditions.

9.4 Vehicle Emissions

On a high-level assessment, the trial is unlikely to have reduced vehicle emissions and has more probably increased them across the network. Vehicles using the corridor experience greater delay and more stop-start operation, increasing emissions per vehicle, while the traffic displaced from the corridor has been redistributed onto adjacent routes that are already congested. The emissions reduction that a genuine shift to cycling would have delivered has not been realised, because that shift has not occurred.

9.5 Matters Identified Prior to Installation

Many of the outcomes documented in this review were identified as risks in the pre-installation technical assessment prepared in January 2025 — the congestion and traffic redistribution arising from the removal of turning lanes, the introduction of new cyclist conflict points to a corridor with no material cyclist crash history, the loss of kerbside space for parking and servicing, and the absence of demonstrated mode shift. The subsequent evidence, including an independent Road Safety Audit, has been consistent with those concerns.

9.6 Overall Assessment

The trial's stated objectives included increasing cycling, improving safety, and supporting the broader transport and environmental goals associated with cycling infrastructure. On the evidence assembled in this review, none of these has been achieved on Collins Street: cyclist volumes have fallen rather than

risen; traffic has been displaced onto surrounding routes that are already congested; and vehicle emissions have more likely increased than decreased.

The road safety outcomes are the most serious of the findings. A corridor that recorded effectively only one cyclist crash across the six years before installation has recorded four in the first year of the trial, two of them involving injury — a new category of crash, directly associated with the trial infrastructure, on a route previously without such a history. Parking-related crashes have increased despite reductions in both parking supply and traffic volume that would ordinarily reduce them, and the first vehicle-door crash in the corridor's recorded history occurred during the trial. An independent Road Safety Audit separately identified an Extreme-rated conflict in the bus turning movement at Barrack Street, together with further hazards at the in-line bus stop, the zebra crossing, and the lane separators. These outcomes are consistent with an installation delivered to compromised design standards within a corridor too narrow to accommodate it.

Of particular concern is that the installation may present as safer than it is. Separated cycling infrastructure is intended to improve both actual and perceived safety, encouraging cycling by reducing exposure to traffic. Where such infrastructure is constructed to compromised standards — with inadequate buffers, rigid separators placed within the path of cyclists, and abrupt lateral deviations — it can convey an impression of protection while introducing hazards of its own. The crash record on Collins Street, in which cyclists have been injured by striking the infrastructure itself, is consistent with a gap between the protection the installation appears to offer and the protection it actually provides. For vulnerable road users in particular, that gap is a serious safety concern.

These findings are subject to the limitations set out in this review — the relatively short post-installation period and the small number of crashes — and the evidence will continue to develop over the remainder of the trial. Those limitations, however, do not displace the conclusion. The crash record, the independent audit, and the constrained geometry point consistently in the same direction, and the safety outcomes for vulnerable road users are sufficiently serious that they should not be allowed to continue unaddressed pending the trial's conclusion.

On the basis of the evidence in this review, intervention is required to prevent continued poor road safety performance on the corridor, particularly for cyclists and other vulnerable road users. The specific hazards identified — the Extreme-rated bus turning conflict, the lane separators that have injured cyclists, the substandard buffer to parked vehicles, the zebra-crossing conflict, and the abrupt lane deviations — warrant remedial action as a matter of priority, independent of any decision about the longer-term future of the trial. More broadly, the review's findings indicate that the trial has not delivered the outcomes intended for it, and that its performance against those objectives, together with its safety record, does not support its continuation in its current form.

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